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The Superfluous Congress: Executive Dominance
and Business Lobbying in Mexico’s 2013
Tax Reform
Mónica Unda Gutiérrez
Marquette University

This paper analyzes the roles played by the legislative, executive, and business sector in Mexico’s 2013 tax reform, drawing on original field-research
findings. I examine each of these actors’ influence over the public period of
congressional debate, as well as the typically invisible agenda-setting stage
and the adoption of executive decrees following the legislative process. I find
that Congress remains subordinated to the executive in budgetary matters
and that business is more central in shaping the details of the tax bill. The tax
reform achieved little, leaving the overall fiscal capacity of the Mexican State
largely unchanged.
Keywords: business power, executive-legislative relations, politics of
policymaking, tax reform

Este artı́culo analiza el papel del legislativo, el ejecutivo y el sector
empresarial en la reforma fiscal de 2013 a partir de los hallazgos del
trabajo de campo. Se examina la influencia de estos tres actores, tanto
en el perı́odo de debate público en el congreso como durante el
establecimiento de la agenda de la reforma y en los decretos del
ejecutivo posteriores al proceso legislativo. Se muestra que el poder
legislativo continúa subordinado al ejecutivo en temas presupuestarios y que el sector empresarial tuvo una mayor influencia para
definir los detalles de la nueva ley tributaria. La reforma tributaria
logró poco, dejando la capacidad recaudatoria del Estado mexicano
sin mayor cambio.
Palabras clave: poder empresarial, polı́ticas públicas, reforma tributaria,
relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo
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Introduction*
Mexican fiscal history is characterized by a constant: poor tax collection. Despite several attempts to reform the tax system, no change has
resulted in a level of tax collection that would place Mexico close to
that of countries at similar income levels. Since 1950, Mexico’s tax
revenue has remained below 12 percent of GDP,1 while Brazil,
Argentina, and South Africa today all collect over 30 percent. While
Mexico’s economy has grown 3.9 percent annually between 1969 and
2015,2 this failure to generate revenue has crippled the state’s ability
to tend to pressing objectives, such as infrastructure investments,
anti-poverty programs, public services, or support for industry.
The Mexican twentieth-century tax story begins with the translation of revolutionary ideas into the tax system, which resulted in the
creation of the income tax in 1925. This tax was intended to be the
backbone of the tax system and would become not only the main
source of revenue but also a redistributive tool. By the mid 1940s, the
income tax was already the principal contributor to tax revenue, but
in order to continue growing, it needed to be reformed. A series of
unsuccessful tax reform attempts ensued, the main ones being those
of 1953, 1961, and 1972.3 These three placed the income tax at the
core of the reform.4 Their aim was, broadly, to tax sources of revenue
not yet reached and to enhance progressiveness. In other words,
these tax reform attempts concentrated on progressive direct taxation and aimed to collect more.
Because these attempted reforms were threatening to higher
income groups, particularly capital holders, they encountered
* I would like to thank José Manuel de Alba Castañeda and Álvaro Quintero for
their valuable research assistance. A previous version of this paper was presented at the
Latin American Studies Association 2015 International Congress in San Juan, Puerto
Rico. For their insightful comments, I am grateful to thank Carlos Urzúa Macı́as, Brian
Palmer-Rubin, James Mahon, Tasha Fairfield, Gabriel Ondetti, Gustavo Flores-Macı́as,
and the three anonymous reviewers.
1. For a comprehensive literature review on the determinants of Mexico’s light
taxation, see Ondetti 2017.
2. Mexico’s GDP in 1969 was equivalent to 2,533,863 million pesos and
14,940,600 in 2014 (constant 2010 pesos).
3. Two other tax-reform episodes were successful: under President José López
Portillo (1976–82), creating the value-added tax; and under President Carlos Salinas
(1988–94), expanding the tax base and increasing incentives to investment through
lower marginal rates (Elizondo 1994). However, these two reforms are essentially
different from those mentioned to the extent that they did not purport to enhance tax
progressiveness.
4. Unless it is relevant to distinguish between corporate and personal income
taxes, the broader term income tax will be used.
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unsurmountable opposition. The two earlier reforms did not even
reach Congress; these were aborted within the Ministry of Finance,
which at the time had conflicting views on taxation. This outcome
was the result of the consolidation of an alliance between the state
and the economic elite, an alliance that prioritized the promotion of
private capital accumulation for the sake of economic growth (industrialization) and political stability (Unda-Gutiérrez 2010). In short, tax
reform proposals that aimed to make the tax system more progressive
and extractive failed; political stability was maintained at the cost of
a poor tax state.
However, Enrique Peña Nieto’s government’s (2012–18) core
initial strategy (publicized under the slogan Mover a México
[Moving Mexico]) was to pass a package of structural reforms that
would unleash a long-awaited economic growth. The tax reform was
part of a broader reform agenda—also including energy, education,
financial, electoral, and telecommunications—and great expectations
were built around it. Nevertheless, Mexico’s 2013 tax reform did not
pose a threat to higher income groups or to capital and did not
produce structural change. This article analyzes the policymaking
process that produced the 2013 tax law and finds that a strong business lobby and a weak legislature—remnants of PRI (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional) dominance in twentieth-century
Mexico—were determinative.
A mediocre reform was not a foregone conclusion. On the
contrary, at the beginning of Peña Nieto’s term, circumstances
appeared to be conducive for a deep tax reform. The Pacto por
México, proposed by Peña Nieto, was a political agreement to smooth
the passing of a set of structural reforms agreed upon by the president and the three major parties that took part in this pact (PRI, PAN
[Partido Acción Nacional], and PRD [Partido de la Revolución
Democrática]). How is it, then, that a tax reform that seemed to have
so much potential achieved so little? What were the roles that key
actors—legislative and executive powers, and the business sector
organizations—played in the policymaking process?
To answer these questions, I reconstruct the 2013 tax reform
process using process tracing. I observe three distinct stages of the
tax process—agenda setting, negotiation in Congress, and postapproval modifications. At each stage, I make “causal process
observations” (Collier 2011, 823), observing the roles played by three
central actors—the legislature, the executive, and business lobbyists.
Evidence is drawn from original field research, including interviews
with congresspersons, cabinet members, and lobbyists; over-time
analysis of official fiscal data; and analysis of the text of the tax law.
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This analysis provides a case study of executive-legislative relations in
a technical realm of policymaking, which offers an opportunity to
observe how much has changed since Mexico’s transition to democracy in terms of increasing the role of Congress and equalizing its
influence to that of the once-hegemonic executive. My ethnographic
findings offer a window to observe the less public relationship
between the business sector and both branches of government, illuminating the means used by business organizations to influence the
tax-policymaking process.
My findings offer two central contributions to the literature on
policymaking in Mexico in terms of the legislative-executive relationship and the power of business. First, I show that the Mexican
legislature remains subordinate to the executive, despite the transition to a more pluralistic democracy in the first three sexenios of
the twentieth century. This subordination is particularly
pronounced in tax policy, a highly technical policy area, confirming
and extending previous findings by Mark Eric Williams (2006). The
legislators lack the technocratic skills necessary to analyze fiscal data
and propose alternative tax bills to the Ministry of Finance, and
depend greatly, rather, on the advice, data, and technical skills of
the Ministry of Finance staff and the business sector. As a result, the
executive has overwhelming power in this area.5 As I show, the
power of the executive branch is illustrated in all three stages: (1)
The Ministry of Finance formulated the proposal in an unusually
hermetic manner, calculating the response of the business sector
and the broader trade-offs implied by the Pacto por México. (2)
During the legislative process, the technocrats of the Ministry of
Finance were omnipresent. In addition to the dependence of legislators on the Ministry of Finance’s expertise, the executive had
control over opposition and PRI legislators via the Pacto’s agreements and the long-lived PRI dynamics, respectively. (3)
Following approval in Congress, the executive, making use of its
extensive decree powers, overrode Congress, granting tax exemptions that altered tax burdens.

5. The predominance of the Ministry of Finance can be traced back to the regime
of Porfirio Dı́az (1876–1910), whose economic policy was run by the cientı́ficos led by
the treasurer José Yves Limantour (Cockcroft 1968). The power of the Ministry of
Finance was also evident during the “stabilizing growth” period (1958–72) (Camp
1992, 176; Izquierdo 1995, 43–47; Ortiz Mena 1998, 47–49), and although this
ministry’s central role was reduced during the time of “shared development” (1972–
82), the Ministry of Finance recouped its dominant role after the debt crisis of 1982
(Centeno and Maxfield 1992).
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Second, I show the strategies and resources that business
groups continue to deploy to exert influence over the process
of economic policymaking. Business groups influenced all three
stages of the reform. First, the noninvestment-threatening nature
of the reform suggests that the business sector’s tacit structural
power set the agenda for the reform proposed by the Ministry of
Finance. Second, during congressional negotiations, business
lobby groups also exercised significant instrumental power,
deploying a variety of political resources (organization, money,
technical expertise, and media access) to influence the legislators’
decisions. Third, continued business lobbying, after Congress
approved the revenue law, pushed the executive to make decrees
that softened the blow of increased taxation for certain influential
business groups.
The executive-legislative power imbalance has important implications for policymaking in Mexico. In contexts where the executive
is so empowered, the influence of external groups may be more
difficult to observe (compared to the legislative floor), and the
opaque agenda-setting stage becomes particularly decisive. This
hypercentralization of policymaking is even more pronounced in
highly technical areas—such as tax policy—where legislators lack the
capacity to research the various provisions and their impact. The
incapacity of the legislature to match the technical prowess of the
executive weakens checks and balances, and jeopardizes political
representation, as Congress is marginalized from the policymaking
process (Williams 2006, 122–23). Moreover, these two factors—executive hegemony and technical incapacity of the legislature—are
common characteristics of transitional democracies and speak to the
limits of theoretical approaches developed to understand tax policy
in the United States and other democracies.
This study proceeds in six sections. The first section introduces
and engages two areas of literature to which my analysis contributes:
executive-legislative relations in Mexico and business power. This is
followed by the analysis of the changes introduced by the 2013
reform and their impact on tax collection. The next three sections
trace and analyze the agenda setting, the legislative process, and the
postcongressional approval stages of the tax reform process, respectively. These three sections concentrate on the role played by business interests and the executive and legislative branches. The
evidence drawn from interviews, the analysis of fiscal data, and the
text of the tax law allows me to trace the ways in which each of these
actors sought to influence the tax reform outcome in each of these
steps. The last section concludes.
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Explaining Tax Reform: Legislative Subordination and
Business Power
This article builds on two literatures to explain Mexico’s tax reform
process, both of which concern executive-legislative relations and
business power. The subordination of Congress to the executive has
been long understood in the Mexican case. Congress’s legislative and
nonlegislative constitutional powers formally endow it with sufficient capacity to legislate and control the executive (Casar 1999,
86–87). The Presidential Legislative Powers Index produced by
Mathew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey (1992), for instance,
scores the Mexican presidency equally as the US presidency,
discarding the notion of an all-powerful executive. However, during
the period of one-party dominance, informal practices precluded the
Mexican legislature from using these powers (Weldon 1997, 101–2).
The federal executive has historically been dominant horizontally
(over the legislative and judicial powers) (Weldon 2002a), as well
as vertically (over state and local governments) (Williams 2002,
177–79). The president and his cabinet routinely interfered with
Congress’s representative function by crafting legislation themselves
with the confidence that legislators would not object (Casar 1999;
Weldon 2002b; Williams 2002; Yamin and Noriega 1999). On the one
hand, the executive counted on the support of a great number of
legislators. On the other, legislators who may have opposed the president on legislation found it in their best interest not to oppose, for
fear that he would use his position as leader of the party to thwart
their professional trajectories. Both of these tools were possible given
that the president interfered in party and electoral matters (Casar
1999, 91), translating into a highly disciplined party and loyalty to
the executive’s decisions.
However, the 1997 election in which the PRI, the president’s
party, lost the absolute majority in the lower chamber altered the
balance of power that had long prevailed between the executive and
the legislative branches (Del Rosal 2008, 11). Thus, opposition party
leaders and scholars alike had high expectations that the legislature
would, for the first time, act as an effective counterbalance of the
executive.6 The executive, after 1997, had lost the ability to automatically pass fiscal bills in Congress, such as the revenue law (Ley de

6. Reflecting this potential expansion of legislative strength, lobbying in Congress
is relatively new. Prior to 1997, business lobbying was conducted almost exclusively
with the executive branch, targeted at the president or cabinet members (Lerdo de
Tejada and Godina 2004, 30).
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Ingresos) and the federal budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la
Federación).7 Research has documented marginally greater leverage
for the legislature in the area of expenditure (Diaz Cayeros and
Magaloni 1998; Sour and Munayer 2007; Ugalde 2014; Weldon
2002b, 2004). However, few studies have addressed the influence
of the legislature over revenue policies in contemporary Mexico.8
This paper helps fill this gap, confirming that the legislature remains
subordinated to the executive branch in fiscal matters, which in
consequence incentivizes business sectoral groups to prioritize their
lobbying on the Ministry of Finance.
A second literature on which this article builds is that of business’s power over economic policy. Mexico’s powerful business organizations are another carry-over from the twentieth century, as
documented by Matilde Luna (1995), Ben Ross Schneider (2002),
and Brian Palmer-Rubin (2016). I observe, however, a modernization
in their tools of influence, such as the employment of technical
experts and economic data—beyond the capacity of Congress—to
shape the debate.
The 2013 tax reform also reveals the continued influence of business groups in the executive and legislative branches. The proposition that business groups have undue access and influence over tax
policymaking is widely understood (Witte 1986). Structural and
instrumental power are two particularly useful concepts when
analyzing this influence. According to Jacob Hacker and Paul
Pierson (2002, 281), structural power is a function that depends on
the crucial role of firms in the production of wealth and wages. In
other words, the consequences of investment decisions give firms
structural power. In contrast, instrumental power involves deliberate
action; it is exercised by explicit political action to affect policy. While
structural power is crucial in the agenda-setting stage—determining
whether a reform proposal is introduced or not and the shape of the
initial proposal—instrumental power becomes most relevant in the
following stages of policymaking, determining how the specifics of
the reform are shaped (279–86).
7. The revenue law is the legal instrument proposed once a year by the executive
to Congress, establishing all the revenue categories to cover the next year’s budget.
The federal budget is proposed by the executive every year to Congress to establish
expenditure categories.
8. Kenneth Shadlen (1999) analyzes the 1998 congressional approval of the
value-added tax (VAT), concluding that, while the 1998 VAT conflict implied
unprecedented public scrutiny and cabinet officials were subjected to intense
questioning by Congress, the president’s original proposal was adopted with only
minor modifications.
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The analysis of the 2013 tax reform suggests that the agendasetting stage put on the table a proposal that was not investment
threatening and thus allowed the reform to move forward. A first
impression may suggest that the introduction of a revenueincreasing tax reform was indicative of weak business structural
power, as conceptualized by Tasha Fairfield (2015). In her proposition about structural power operationalization, Fairfield qualifies
weak business structural power as the situation in which policymakers are not concerned about the investment response (7). My
findings, however, point to the opposite: strong business structural
power kept off the agenda a more revenue-enhancing or more
progressive reform that would had been more threatening to capital.
As I suggest in the following section, the reform was rather petty (not
investment threatening) since it only aimed to recoup some of the
revenue loss resulting from declining public oil revenue.
Similarly, this work shows that the details of the tax bill were
shaped by business groups’ instrumental power—“the multiple
means and mechanisms through which business can exert influence”
(Fairfield 2015, 10). Mexican business organizations deployed
different political resources (organization, money, technical expertise, and media access) to influence the tax-policymaking process
more effectively. They used their informal ties to legislators and
bureaucrats during and after the legislative process to create bias in
their favor. The interviews conducted provide evidence of the strategies and political resources used by them in order to shape the tax
bill. This account helps to explain how they lobbied in Congress,
organized collective action, and shaped public opinion.
The Impact of the 2013 Tax Reform
This section explains the changes proposed by the 2013 tax reform
and the reform’s impact on subsequent tax revenue and composition.
The overall picture is of a reform that increased revenue only marginally, with the burden falling disproportionately on the lower classes.
The 2013 reform instituted six main changes. (1) Four new excise
taxes were created: on flavored beverages, high-calorie food, pesticides, and carbon emissions. (2) The value-added tax (VAT) in the
border region (twenty kilometers from the border), which previously
had been set at the reduced rate of 11 percent, was raised to the
national tax rate of 16 percent. (3) Two direct taxes were eliminated:
the IDE (Impuesto sobre Depósitos en Efectivo), a tax on cash
deposits, and the IETU (Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única), a flat
tax on individual and corporate revenue. (4) The tax reform also
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Figure 1. Tax composition and revenue as percentage of Mexican GDP.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from INEGI 2020b and SHCP n.d. (b).

introduced a “new” regime aimed at taxing the informal sector. This
regime would incorporate informal individuals and corporations in
order to gradually tax them; the scheme was designed to tax them
fully by the tenth year after incorporated (2023). (5) The income tax
on individuals and corporations was modified, increasing the
maximum rate on personal income from 30 percent to 35 percent
and including higher income brackets. 9 The tax deductions
permitted to individuals were limited to the lowest of either 10
percent of an individual’s annual salary or four annual minimum
wages. Finally, individuals’ stock exchange profits, which had never
been taxed, were taxed by the income tax at 10 percent. (6) Changes
to the corporate income tax included the cancellation of both the tax
consolidation system and the simplified and special regimes, and the
introduction of a 10 percent income tax on dividend revenues. Of
these changes, all but the third (the elimination of IDE and IETU)
were designed to increase revenue.
The above changes generated heated debate in public opinion; it
was perhaps the most visible and contentious tax reform since
President Carlos Salinas’s reform in the early 1990s. At first glance,
it may appear that the reform increased revenue substantially. Since
2013, tax revenue has increased from 9.6 percent of GDP to 13.2
percent in 2019 (see fig. 1). However, one-third of the increase has
9. Previously, in 2013, the highest bracket was equivalent to 41,667 pesos per
month. In 2014, the highest bracket includes revenue from 250,000 pesos per month
and above.
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been due to the IEPS (Impuesto Especial sobre Productos y Servicios)
on gasoline and diesel, an excise tax that was not altered during the
2013 reform.
The increase in IEPS revenue is due to two factors. First, IEPS
revenue increased in comparison to previous years, as the need to
subsidize gasoline and diesel prices waned given the decreasing
international oil prices. These fuel subsidies are counted as negative
tax revenue. Thus, in times of high oil prices, the subsidy necessary to
keep prices stable is reflected in lower levels of IEPS collection (see
the negative IEPS revenue for 2008 and 2010–14 in fig. 1). The 2015–
19 period has featured low global oil prices and thus a lower subsidy.
Second, the IEPS law was reformed in 2015, softening the subsidy
mechanism to gradually liberalize oil prices (COFECE 2019). As result
of the reform and lower international oil prices since the end of 2014,
there has been revenue generated by the IEPS. This has represented
around 1.12 percent of GDP in the last five years.
The remaining contributors to the overall tax increase have
mostly been due the income tax and the VAT. Unfortunately, no
disaggregated information on income tax or VAT is public, as in the
case for the IEPS. The lack of transparency on tax incidence data
further limits the assessment of each of the changes brought about
by the tax reform. It is difficult to know, for instance, if the new taxes
on dividends and stock exchange profits—progressive measures—
have yielded results or how much was recouped from limiting tax
deductions and cancelling special income tax regimes. In other
words, tax-data opacity obstructs knowing who is paying and how
much, consequently preventing us from better assessing the tax
system.10
In the grand scheme of things, the postreform tax revenue gains
have mirrored the losses in oil revenue. Figure 2 shows a negative
correlation between tax and oil revenue and a total government
revenue. The oil-revenue loss resulting from a decline in both international oil prices and Petróleos Mexicanos’ (PEMEX) oil production
has been offset by tax revenue. On the one hand, keeping the federal
government revenue constant despite the oil-revenue reduction is an
achievement. Indeed, 3.6 percent of GDP has been gained through

10. The Ministry of Finance provides more disaggregated tax data in the appendixes of the quarterly reports that it sends to Congress. These data, however, are still
not sufficiently disaggregated to be able to calculate the revenue from each of these
distinct tax instruments. These reports are available at SHCP (Secretarı́a de Hacienda y
Crédito Público) database, https://www.finanzaspublicas.hacienda.gob.mx/es/
Finanzas_Publicas/Informes_al_Congreso_de_la_Union.
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additional taxation. On the other hand, the overall stability of federal
government revenue can be seen as a missed opportunity, given that
Mexico continues to collect much less in taxation than other middleincome countries.
Agenda Setting: Pacto por México and Business Power Set
the Limits
This section analyzes the agenda-setting stage, when the Ministry of
Finance designed the tax bill months before it was presented in
Congress on September 8, 2013. Using data from interviews, I elucidate the negotiation that took place during this typically opaque
period in the policy process. I interviewed (1) deputies in the
Finance Committee, (2) this committee’s staff, and (3) lobbyists who
approached legislators and members of the Ministry of Finance.11
11. Eleven interviews were conducted in Mexico City: (1) Deputy Javier Treviño,
April 19, 2013; (2) Deputy Margarita Licea, December 3, 2013; (3) Deputy Javier
Treviño, December 4, 2013; (4) Eduardo Obregón, committee staff member,
December 4, 2013; (5) Mario Fuentes, committee staff member, Finance Committee’s
technical secretary, October 22, 2014; (6) Eduardo Obregón, committee staff member,
October 22, 2014; (7) Deputy Carlos Alberto Garcı́a, October 23, 2014; (8) Raúl
Rodrı́guez, CONCAMIN (Confederación de Cámaras Industriales [National
Confederation of Industrial Chambers]) and CANACINTRA (Cámara Nacional de la
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The Finance Committee is one of the fifty-two ordinary committees
by which the lower chamber is organized; its members (forty-four in
2013) are responsible for analyzing and assessing public revenue
bills, including tax reform proposals.12
I find that the agenda-setting stage resulted in a tax bill that found
its boundaries within the Pacto por México and business’s structural
power. The options put on the negotiation table by the Ministry of
Finance were discussed and determined by the high leadership of the
three main political parties in the broader picture of structural
reforms, far from the more public and democratic discussion that the
legislative process entails. Business interest groups mattered too. As
suggested by Fairfield (2015, 3–9), business structural power is a critical variable in explaining the agenda-formulation outcome. Thus, if
business’s structural power is weak, policymakers can carry on with
their proposal even if business interests are negatively affected.
Likewise, if policymakers do not perceive the reform to produce
disinvestment with consequential aggregate economic impacts, the
agenda-formulation stage will continue as planned (3–9), as
happened in the Mexican case. Indeed, decision makers at the
Ministry of Finance did not perceive the tax bill as investment threatening. Economic investment in Mexico increased postreform.13 The
need to raise a little more tax revenue to offset the oil-revenue loss
and keep the overall public revenue constant made the political cost
of those who bore the new tax burden palatable to the executive.
The Pacto’s underlying agreement assumes that the main
obstacle to passing economic reforms had been a Congress that had
had no absolute majority in the hands of a single party since 1997.
Even though a divided Congress—an additional veto player—can
hinder structural reforms, it is not a sufficient explanation for the
reform stagnation in Mexico (Lehoucq 2007). This is evident by the
lack of structural tax reforms before and after the transition to
democracy (Aboites and Unda 2012). Ultimately, a political pact of
this nature required several different negotiations (as many as
reforms presented) and trade-offs among the negotiating actors. As
-

Industria de Transformación [National Chamber of Industry]) lobbyist, October 23,
2014; (9) Ignacio Garcı́a, CCE (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial [Business
Coordinating Council]) lobbyist, October 23, 2014; (10) Fernando Coronel, CCE
lobbyist, October 23, 2014; (11) Alehira Orozco, Polithink lobbyist, October 24, 2014.
12. Article 39 and 43 of the Ley Orgánica del Congreso General de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos rule on the Chamber of Deputies Committee and the Finance
Committee, respectively.
13. Economic investment in Mexico went up after 2013. The gross fixed investment index (2013 ¼ 100) was 103.1 in 2014 and 108.2 in 2015 (INEGI 2020a).
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Deputy Javier Treviño put it when speaking about the electoral
reform and the energy reform, “If you want that one [electoral
reform] and you need us, I need the other one [the energy reform]
and I help you” (Interview 3; see n11 for numbered list of all interviews conducted). The tax reform was one of the most valuable
bargaining chips.
During the agenda-setting phase, the Office of the Undersecretary
of Revenue of the Ministry of Finance kept the reform proposal under
wraps. Interviewees highlighted the government’s level of secrecy and
refusal to provide any hints as to the type of tax bill that was being
formulated; some even stressed the contrast between Peña Nieto’s
government and the previous two, arguing that Vicente Fox and
Felipe Calderón’s terms were characterized by the leaking of information in similar situations.
Contrary to previous experiences and their own expectations,
legislators were not informed about the tax bill. Members of the
Finance Committee were briefed on the tax bill one day before it was
presented in the Chamber of Deputies. Some legislators disagreed
with the government’s approach and emphasized that “previous
reforms [referring to the financial and communications reforms]
were done, as well, by a small group” and that “they didn’t say
anything or consult with anybody” (Interview 3).
The Ministry of Finance’s discretion did not mean that interest
groups did not try to influence the tax bill. The Mexican government
has long had the habit of informally consulting private sector associations before implementing major policy initiatives (Schneider 2002,
87–88). Business groups, such as the national confederations of
Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO [Confederación de
Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo]) and
Industry (CONCAMIN [Confederación de Cámaras Industriales]),
and the Business Coordinating Council (CCE [Consejo
Coordinador Empresarial]), presented their suggestions and
demands to the Office of the Undersecretary of Revenue. They
stressed and even praised the “sensitive attitude of the Ministry of
Finance,” the “always listening attitude of Miguel Messmacher” (the
undersecretary of revenue), and the fact that “the door of the undersecretary of revenue was open” (Interviews 8, 9, 10, 11). As Raúl
Rodrı́guez, one of the interviewees, expressed, “The Minister of
Finance went out of his way to listen to the monologues of interest
groups, but there was never a dialogue. They were very good at
‘putting on a poker face’” (Interview 8).
The government’s strategy of secrecy was so successful that most
people, including legislators, interest groups, and the general public,
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were surprised by the tax bill—and especially that it did not propose
to eliminate the zero-VAT tax rate on food and medicine. In March
2013, the PRI Assembly reformed the party statutes, since these had
previously forbidden support for the VAT on food and medicine and
for private sector involvement in PEMEX. The exclusion of VAT on
food and medicine was not the only surprise; the excise taxes (IEPS)
on flavored beverages and high-calorie foods were also not expected
by many, not even by those affected.14
The interparty bargaining contained in the Pacto por México
explains the exclusion of the VAT on food and medicine in the tax
bill. The PRI negotiators conceded this to the leaders of the left-wing
PRD, who were openly opposed to taxes on food and medicine. In
exchange, leaders of the PRD supported other reforms presented by
the federal government, such as the energy reform. According to the
Ministry of Finance’s annual reports on tax expenditure,15 a VAT on
food and medicine in 2014 would have been equivalent to 0.90
percent and 0.07 percent of GDP respectively (see fig. 4 for tax expenditure data). This “negotiation cost” was likely one of the factors that
encouraged the government to increase revenue through other
changes, such as the leveling of the VAT rate in the border area and
the adoption of four new IEPS (excise taxes). The PAN opposed these
two changes, and, as a result, almost all of the PAN deputies ended up
voting against the bill in Congress. In sum, business groups assured
that the tax bill was not investment threatening both through invisible structural power and through concerted actions of lobbying with
the executive branch. The Pacto’s broader set of negotiations
between the three major political parties led to further modification
yet did not alter the generally modest outline of the reform.
The Legislative Process: Mucho ruido y pocas nueces
While much fanfare was made about consideration of the reform
during the legislative period, very little was changed from the version
of the bill originally submitted by the executive. The actions of business lobbyists and the negotiation in Congress were oriented more to
a public spectacle to increase public support for the reform. The
14. Lobbyist Alehira Orozco, explaining the failure of the soft drink industry,
suggested that the industry, because it never expected that the government would “do
that to them,” was late in lobbying against the new taxes (Interview 11).
15. Tax expenditure is defined as any reduction in government tax revenue due
to preferential tax treatments, such as deductions, reduced tax rates, or credits.
Taxpayers who are subject to preferential treatments are effectively receiving a subsidy
from the government.
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4. FC voting on the
modified bill

8. Senate FC voting
on the modified bill

7. Senate FC
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modified bill
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sent to the executive
for publication

Figure 3. The legislative process of a Mexican tax reform. Stage 3 is
highlighted as the stage on which the analysis is focused.

executive presented the tax bill to the Chamber of Deputies on
September 8, 2013, and the approved law was sent back to the executive on October 31, 2013, for publication in the Official Federal
Gazette. Figure 3 describes the eleven stages of the tax bill process
that took place during these two months. This section mainly focuses
on the first five, which correspond to the debate and negotiation in
the lower chamber, where the bulk of the legislative decisions on
public revenue and expenditure were made.
The legislative process started with the presentation of the tax bill in
the Finance Committee by the Office of the Undersecretary of Revenue.
Several meetings were spent going through the bill in detail, and, as
Deputy Treviño said, “It is as if the people from the Ministry of Finance
move in to live with us at the Finance Committee” (Interview 1).
Subsequently, the Finance Committee members called for public
hearings, in which, over four days, eighty-six different organizations
presented their views on the tax bill, discussed its impacts, and
proposed changes. However, the public hearings had little influence
on the tax proposal. According to interviewees, the public hearings
were a formality; they were attended by very few Finance Committee
members, and their format (many presentations in a very short time)
was not conducive to engage legislators to listen. As the lobbyist
Rodrı́guez said, “[Public hearings] are frustrating. You prepare your
case well, and there are only three or four legislators. . . . It seems like
a medical consultation of a village doctor” (Interview 8). The stage in
which the bill can change the most is during the deputies’ Finance
Committee negotiation panels (mesas de trabajo/negociaci ón;
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Interviews 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10). The Finance Committee has to deliver
a modified bill (dictamen) to the lower chamber plenary session,
which is the result of negotiations between Finance Committee
members, interest group lobbyists, and the Office of the
Undersecretary of Revenue officials.
However, even during this stage, little changed in the bill. As I
show here, three elements help to explain of the irrelevance of this
stage: the legislature’s lack of technical capacity, the small percentage
by which Congress changes the tax revenue target, and the inconsequential nature of the legislators’ amendments. Each of these
elements provide confirmation of the legislature as a minor player,
submissive to the Ministry of Finance and the business sector in
budgetary and tax policymaking.
Even though there was little reason to expect substantive change
during this phase, business sector groups, as well as representatives
from the Ministry of Finance, are constantly present during the
congressional process. Lobbyists from the CCE, CONCAMIN, and
CANACINTRA (Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación)
used very similar strategies to influence the tax outcome while the bill
was debated in Congress. First, after analyzing the tax bill among
their members and fiscal specialists,16 they met with parliamentary
coordinators and presented their views about the tax bill. For
decades, business groups in Mexico have enjoyed access to seats on
boards of public entities or economic commissions. This has created
incentives for business associations to invest in research departments, such as the Centro de Estudios Económicos del Sector
Privado, to exert their influence better (Schneider 2002, 87).
Second, business organizations’ lobbyists approached key Finance
Committee members and met with them regularly; they first
discussed the issues for which business groups constituted a common
front, then moved to more specific tax matters relevant to each business group. Some lobbyists call this “the bubble strategy,” given that
they approach only a few Finance Committee members—“never
more than ten”—usually the Finance Committee’s president and
secretaries, from different parties (Interviews 8, 9, 10).17

16. Business groups rely on the Private Sector Economic Studies Center (CEESP),
and most business organizations also have fiscal committees that produce technical
reports.
17. The party composition of the 2013 Finance Committee was the following:
PRI, 40.91 percent; PAN, 25 percent; PRD, 20.45 percent; PVEM (Partido Verde
Ecologista de México), 6.82 percent; PANAL (Partido Nueva Alianza), MC (Movimiento
Ciudadano), and PT (Partido del Trabajo), 2.27 percent each.
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The fact that lobbyists engage in negotiations with legislators
does not mean that they leave the executive aside. As a lobbyist
expressed, “We approach the legislature but don’t leave the executive. It is a fundamental issue, it is a practice, and it has always been
like that: the control of the Ministry of Finance in the legislative is
absolute” (Interview 8). In sum, congresspersons and lobbyists
recognize “that the ability to make changes in the legislature without
the executive’s consent is minimal” (Interview 9). In this light, lobbyists seem to be active in Congress to make sure that legislators do not
go off the rails by changing the bill too far from what was determined
before presenting the bill in Congress.
Lobbyists used a wide variety of resources to influence the negotiation panels. Aside from direct lobbying (participation in public
hearings, formal and informal contact with legislators and members
of the executive), they also lobbied indirectly, aiming to influence
public opinion through the media. Business groups and other
interest groups, such as those supporting the tax on flavored
beverages, were particularly active in this area (Interviews 8, 9, 10,
11), organizing press conferences, publishing statements in newspapers, and disseminating their views on social networks and their
websites.
However, the main mode of influence used by lobbyists was to
provide decision makers with technical reports. According to José
Gómez Valle (2008, 116), this is the principal way in which lobbyists
in the Mexican Congress have tried to influence legislators. Lobbyists
consider it a fundamental part of their job to provide strong arguments backed up by data to convince legislators to adhere to the
model that they received from the executive (Interview 8). Thus,
business groups’ research centers are crucial to assure that
independent-minded members of Congress do not substantially alter
the reform proposal that came out of the Ministry of Finance.
The inability of legislators to access alternative sources of data
and research make them beholden to lobbyists’ analyses in order to
understand the potential impact of the reform. In the words of
Rodrı́guez, lobbyist for CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA, “There is a big
weakness in the legislature; the lack of resources prevents them from
having professional advisors. The committees do have a technical
secretary; however, they do not have information or data. So, we tell
them, ‘Stop fooling around, you are going to make the decision, but
let us give you useful information’” (Interview 8). These findings
resonate with scholars who have argued that interest groups are
more successful at influencing tax policy than other types of policies,
given that “its complex, technical character makes it easier for them
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to disguise their real influence in legal and economic jargon” (Peters
1991, 12).
The Finance Committee’s lack of technical capacity is not
a minor disadvantage. On the contrary, it makes them dependent
on information provided by interest groups and the Ministry of
Finance. The Research Center on Public Finances (Centro de
Estudios en Finanzas Públicas [CEFP]) is intended to serve as
technical advisor for deputies on public revenue and expenditure
matters. However, according to some of the interviewees and
CEFP personnel, the center provides only basic analyses, relying
on insufficient and out-of-date data (Interviews 1, 3, 8). One of the
center researchers claimed that they do not have access to the
Ministry of Finance data besides what is available for everyone
in the reports that the ministry must provide to Congress.
Deputy Treviño lamented the center’s situation and posited that
“if the chamber had, as the United States Congress,
a Congressional Research Service, which has first-level technical
advisors, things would change radically for Congress members,
but we still depend a lot on the Ministry of Finance” (Interview
3). The Finance Committee’s lack of technical capacity and its
subordination to the Ministry of Finance on tax policy constitute
a stark contrast to the influence that the Congressional Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and the Department of
the Treasury have had in shaping tax reforms’ outcomes in the
United States (Verdier 1988).
The weakness of the CEFP underscores the inconsistent nature of
the technocratic revolution in Mexican governance. In Mexico, as
elsewhere in Latin America, the adoption of neoliberal market
reforms was accompanied by the rise of technocrats to power
(Domı́nguez 1997; Centeno 1994; Centeno and Silva 1998). Even
though technocrats had long dominated the economic and finance
branches of the executive in Mexico (Camp 1987; Smith 1979), it was
with the transition to democracy that the technical superiority of the
executive vis-à-vis the legislative became a salient concern. As
Williams (2006, 137) suggested, “In a technocratic environment, the
prospects of greater horizontal accountability via Congress hinge on
the legislature’s ability to upgrade its technical capacity.” In countries
like Argentina, the ruling party, tired of rubber-stamping executive’s
bills, sought a tactic of “negotiated support” with the executive
(Corrales 2004, 7), which involved the exchange of concessions
among them. This tactic could only work if the legislative branch
upgraded its technical skills (by employing more technocrats) to
become a capable negotiator. In contrast, the Mexican legislature has
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not gained the technical expertise necessary to hold the executive
accountable.18 Even though the CEFP was born in 1998 as a result of
the first divided Congress, it has remained weak and poorly staffed.19
Once negotiation panels end, the resulting agreements are taken
to the Finance Committee technical secretary for drafting of the
modified bill. According to technical secretary staffer Mario
Fuentes, “The modified bill is written in accordance with the executive bill; it is always in his terms . . . and when the dictamen is ready,
we share it with the Ministry of Finance. Why? Because we need to be
sure there are no legal inconsistencies that result in a loss of revenue”
(Interview 5).20
Subsequently, the modified bill is sent to the Senate (see fig. 3)
for discussion in its Finance Committee, voted on in the full Senate,
and sent back to the lower chamber to conclude the process. A new
tax on high-calorie foods was introduced during the negotiation
panels in the Senate. The passage of the so-called junk food tax was
unexpected by many, including staff of the Ministry of Finance.
Senators proposed this new tax using the same arguments as the tax
on flavored beverages: that it would disincentivize consumption of
unhealthy foods and would generate greater fiscal revenue.21 The
Minister of Finance “decided to give it a try” (Interview 11). The tax
was so “unplanned” that “there were no revenue estimations, no
calculations of its impact. They were lucky—les cayó del cielo”
(Interview 11). Ultimately, however, this constituted a small
percentage of the incidence of the reform.
The weak position of the legislature in budgetary issues can also
be evaluated in terms of how much Congress changes the executive’s
bill. Thus, scholars have assessed the impact of a more plural legislature on the federal budget by measuring the difference between the
budget proposed by the executive and the one approved by
18. Explaining why the Mexican Congress has not matched the executive’s
technical capacity is beyond this paper’s aim. For a discussion on the subject and some
potential explanatory variables, see Williams 2006, 137–38.
19. The CEFP reported having thirty-one employees, none with a PhD, and 71
percent with only undergraduate degrees. This data was taken from the CEFP organizational chart, published on its website in 2015: https://cefp.gob.mx.
20. The Mexican Ministry of Finance loses a great amount of resources due to the
amparo fiscal (Elizondo 2009). Taxpayers, who have the economic and technical
resources, have used the amparo fiscal (loosely, a write of protection) since 1962 to
pay less (Elizondo and Pérez de Acha 2006). Wealthy taxpayers often use this legal
instrument because tax laws have legal inconsistencies and because of the way in
which the Supreme Court has interpreted the law (mostly in favor of the taxpayer).
21. For the explanatory memorandum on the junk food tax, see Gaceta
Parlamentaria 2013.
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Congress. They have found that the legislature has enjoyed slightly
more leverage in budgetary issues as the two congressional chambers
have become more plural (Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni 1998; Sour
and Munayer 2007; Ugalde 2014). According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, the legislature’s amendments to the budget in recent years add up to an average of 4.8
percent of the total proposed by the executive, which is very low
compared to parliamentary regimes but similar to comparable countries like Brazil or Argentina (OCDE 2009, 83). No similar studies
have been conducted to measure the impact that a more diverse
Congress has had on the revenue law, as this paper does.
I have found that the changes in the revenue law before and after
this bill was discussed in Congress are minimal. The comparison
between the revenue laws proposed by the executive and the revenue
laws approved by Congress22 between 2000 and 2016 indicate that
the legislature has increased tax revenue by 1.1 percent yearly on
average. Nevertheless, real tax collection in most years is below what
the revenue law stipulates. On average, from 2000 to 2015, tax collection was 2.9 percent lower than projected by revenue laws.
Another way to appreciate the minor role played by legislators is
by analyzing the initiatives and changes they proposed. I found that
most of these interventions were inconsequential. According to
congressional records and the federal gazette during the length of
the legislative process, seven tax bills from the Senate and twentyeight from the Chamber of Deputies were discussed.23 Out of the
thirty-five initiatives in Congress that were discussed, 51 percent were
from PAN members, 29 percent from PRD, 11 percent from PRI, and 9
percent from PVEM (the Green Party) members. Most of the tax bills
aimed to add tax exemptions or increased deductions to the income
and VATs for very specific taxpayers. For instance, (1) income tax
deductions on traveling expenses and restaurants were increased,
(2) VAT zero tax rate was extended to bulldozers, and (3) investments
in real estate in world heritage cities could be deducted from income
tax payments. Very few legislators (thirty) made these minor proposals for modifications, which did not alter the executive’s initiative in
a meaningful way.
The modified draft was passed from the upper to the lower
chamber at the end of October 2013. The final vote in the upper
chamber approved the 2014 revenue law by 71 votes in favor (59.2
22. Revenue laws proposed and approved are found at SHCP 2000–19.
23. The upper chamber is integrated with 120 members and the lower chamber
with 500.
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percent) and 45 against, and the lower chamber approved it with 279
in favor (55.8 percent of total deputies) and 136 against. None of the
PRI deputies or senators voted against the bill. In contrast, only one
PAN deputy voted in favor as the party opposed raising the VAT in the
border region and extending the IEPS. The majority in both chambers
necessary to pass the bill was achieved through the positive votes of
PRI and PRD members alone. The PAN’s approval was not necessary
to pass the bill, and this party’s legislators openly rejected what the
executive proposed. The approved law was sent to the executive and
published in the Official Federal Gazette on November 20, 2013.24
Postapproval Executive Decrees Further Favor Business
Interests
The mostly invisible period after approval of the tax law in Congress
offered a final opportunity for the executive and business to exert
influence over the tax law outcome. During this period, through
executive decrees, the Ministry of Finance introduced changes that
diminished the impact of the new tax law for select contributors.
Such “tax expenditures”25 are a particularly important cause of low
tax collection in Mexico. According to the Inter-American
Development Bank’s study on tax expenditure, Mexico spends more
on tax expenditure, relative to GDP, than Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Peru—countries that levy much higher taxes as
a percent of GDP (Villela, Jorratt, and Lembruger 2009, 59).
Moreover, the amount of resources spent on tax expenditure in
Mexico is questionable considering the regressive tendency of these
special treatments, tax benefits, and fiscal subsidies.
The Mexican executive has impressive constitutional powers over
postlegislative tax policy, including the powers to (1) exempt, totally
or partially, from tax payments and to authorize the timing and
period of tax payments; (2) rule on tax control, administration procedures, and periods of payment; and (3) establish fiscal subsidies and
benefits.26 Therefore, interest groups continue to lobby with the
executive after the revenue law is published. According to the
24. Secretaria de Gobernación, Diario Oficial de la Federación, November 20,
2013, https://www.dof.gob.mx/index_113.php? year¼2013&month¼11&day¼20.
25. The Ministry of Finance defines tax expenditures as “fiscal treatments that
divert from the federal tax’s normal structure considering the in-force tax provisions”
(SHCP 2014).
26. Constitutional article 89 I, article 31 IX in the Ley Orgánica de la
Administración Pública Federal and article 39 III in the Federation Fiscal Code give the
executive such faculty.
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lobbyist Rodrı́guez, it is the strategy of “de lo perdido lo que
aparezca” (Interview 8; salvaging gains after a loss). We may expect
even greater influence by interest groups during this rather discretionary and opaque executive procedure of modifying minutiae of tax
policy, such as deductions and exemptions, which often create loopholes to benefit specific actors (Peters 1991, 12).
According to Rodrı́guez, at this point business representatives
went higher up in the hierarchy; many contacted the president and
the treasurer to argue how damaging the new measures would be on
different economic sectors and to suggest ways to reduce the impact
(Interview 8). Eventually, the executive delivered two decrees, which,
according to business lobbyist Ignacio Garcı́a, were the result of negotiations between their fiscal specialists, the tax administration office,
and the Ministry of Finance (Interview 9). Lobbyist Fernando Coronel
mentioned that some of the fiscal measures included in the December
2013 decrees were incorporated into the tax law the following year to
eliminate the transitory character of the decrees (Interview 10). The
timing of these decrees—during winter vacations—appeared to be
intentionally selected to avoid public attention.
In the view of private sector lobbyists, “the executive is very clever
because once he achieves his aim [referring to the revenue law], he
then talks to those affected and through a decree or the fiscal miscellany—not including the legislative, not politicking the issue—the
executive can take measures to benefit these groups” (Interviews 8
and 10). Some interviewed deputies and Finance Committee staff
described the decrees as complementary to the law, saying that their
function was mainly to compensate for the lack of clarity or gaps in
the tax laws (Interviews 3 and 7). However, an analysis of the content
of these decrees suggests that they constituted much more than an
administrative “cleaning up” and were rather designed to compensate specific economic groups.
The two decrees published at the end of December 2013 by the
executive were (1) the decree on fiscal subsidies to the manufacturing
industry, assembly plants, and exporting companies; and (2) a decree
combining several tax benefits and administrative facilities. The
former moderated the impact of increasing the VAT from 11 to 16
percent in the border region (Interviews 9 and 10). The latter included
some new tax benefits and reinstituted others from previous years.
Some of the subsidies from the first decree clearly reduced the impact
of tax changes included in the revenue law.27
27. For instance, juices and yogurts, regardless of their caloric content, were
granted an exemption from VAT. In other words, while these products were newly
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In conclusion, the decrees silently changed what had been
passed in the legislature and softened the tax reform impact in
response to private sector lobbyists. Two deputies publicly disagreed
with the decrees and exhorted the executive to inform Congress
about the decrees’ impact on public revenue. In their opinion, “this
tax-concessions package was delivered in an opaque and discretionary context,” and “it was unacceptable that the executive did not
estimate the costs implied by both decrees to the Ministry of
Finance’s revenue.”28 According to the deputies, “it was evident that
once the tax reform was passed, private sector lobbyists kept pressing
the executive; they achieved tax benefits for economic sectors like
cargo and passenger transportation, junk food, the mining industry,
private schools, and department stores” (Interviews 9 and 10).
The executive, in the Official Federal Gazette, justified these
decrees on the grounds of economic competitiveness. 29
Unfortunately, there are no studies (or none yet known by this
writer) that assess the consequences of these tax benefits. In other
words, no accountability in this important policymaking process
exists. Moreover, the amount of resources the Ministry of Finance
is losing due to the executive’s constitutional capacity to define tax
administration procedures and to grant tax exemptions, fiscal subsidies, and benefits is not small. Tax expenditure estimations can give
us a sense of the amount of resources lost.
Figure 4 shows the estimates on total tax expenditure and
composition in Mexico from 2002 to 2019. It includes all types of tax
expenditure including those special treatments granted by the executive (like those included in the 2013 decrees) and those granted by
the legislature (Villela, Jorratt, and Lembruger 2009, 57). Tax expenditure in 2002 represented 4.4 percent of GDP and increased to 6.3
percent in 2008 (mainly due to the IEPS subsidy on gasoline and
diesel, given high international prices). It dropped to 2.8 percent
of GDP right after the reform (given that no IEPS subsidy was necessary) and by 2019 had increased to almost 4 percent of GDP.
Unfortunately, reports on tax expenditure made by the Ministry of
Finance do not provide data about the taxpayers who are subject to
-

subject to the junk-food tax, their consumers were compensated by not paying the
VAT.
28. The initiative to exhort the executive on the decrees was undertaken on
January 8, 2014, by Roxana Luna Porquillo and Carol Antonio Altamirano, both PRD
members (Diario de los Debates 2014).
29. Secretaria de Gobernación, Diario Oficial de la Federación, December 26,
2013, https://www.dof.gob.mx/index_113.php? year¼2013&month¼12&day¼26.
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Figure 4. Tax expenditure in Mexico, 2002–19. Source: Own elaboration
based on data from the annual reports Presupuesto de Gastos Fiscales (SHCP
2002–19).

such special treatments. Moreover, data used in these reports are
estimates calculated a year prior to the year reported.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed the scope of Mexico’s 2013 tax reform and
has analyzed how the reform was modified during three stages:
agenda setting, negotiation in Congress, and postapproval executive
decrees. The study examines the different actors that tried to influence the tax outcome during these three stages: the Ministry of
Finance, members of Congress, and business lobbying groups. It
does so employing process tracing to reconstruct the stages of the
reform, field interviews with the main actors that shaped the taxpolicymaking process, and analysis of fiscal data.
This work’s main contribution lies in its comprehensive and close
analysis of the decision-making process behind a contentious policy
area. It sheds light on executive-legislative relations in a technical
realm of policymaking. By doing so, it confirms the subordinated role
of the legislative, which has not upgraded its technical capacity to
challenge and be able to negotiate with the executive on revenue
issues. The minor role played by Congress shows how little things
have changed after the transition to democracy in terms of the balance
of power between the executive and the legislature. This continued
subordination of Congress in tax-policy matters is somewhat
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surprising given that it has exhibited a newly found ability to influence
fiscal policy on the expenditure side in the period since alternation.
This paper also helps elucidate the role played by business organizations in the tax-policymaking process. The fact that business
holds influence over economic policy is not new for Mexico, yet the
ways in which the private sector exerts this influence have somehow
changed. The lobbying industry is relatively nascent in Mexico—
having previously been submerged into hierarchical institutions of
state corporatism (Luna and Tirado 1992; Grayson 1998; Schneider
2002). The present period displays a diverse set of tools for political
influence deployed by business confederations. I uncovered three
modes of lobbying: (1) intensive consultation and collaboration with
the Ministry of Finance on the design of the proposal; (2) highly
public advising of legislators during congressional debate, based on
the sharing of analysis gathered by the private sector groups; and (3)
behind-closed-doors communications with high-level figures in the
executive (including the president) to request decrees granting
exemptions.
Despite the encouraging circumstances implied by the Pacto por
México, the resulting bill only raised revenue moderately, which I
suggest is due primarily to the agenda-setting power of business and
only secondarily to the limitations imposed by interparty bargaining
in the context of the Pacto por México. Tax collection from 2013 to
2019 increased by 3.6 percent of GDP. However, a third of the
increase was due to a non-tax-reform related trend: the transition
from a negative collection on the IEPS on gasoline and diesel to
a positive one, as shown in figure 1. The rest of the increase was due
to higher tax collection of the income tax, VAT, and new excises.
However, it is not possible to accurately assess the exact impact of
the 2013 tax reform given the lack of disaggregated information. It is
unknown, for instance, if the new taxes on dividends and stock
exchange profits have yielded results or how much was recouped
from limiting tax deductions and cancelling special income tax
regimes. Tax opacity, in this sense, obstructs us from assessing the
tax incidence implied by the reform. But one thing is very clear: the
tax revenue gained after 2013 has perfectly offset the oil-revenue loss
resulting from a decline in both international oil prices and PEMEX’s
oil production, leaving the Mexican government with the same
overall fiscal capacity. Thus, we can characterize the reform as an
exercise in “changing to remain the same” and squandering a window
of opportunity to structurally reform the tax system.
The Ministry of Finance, at the earliest stage of the taxpolicymaking process, listened carefully to business sector groups,
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which likely communicated the limits posed by capital. In this light,
the ministry formulated a proposal to increase tax collection without
significantly disrupting the status quo. This stage in the taxpolicymaking process appears to be where the main content of the
tax reform was determined, confirming that countries with less
democratic institutional decision-making structures (like Mexico) are
shaped to a greater extent during the agenda-setting stage, away from
the eyes of the public. As Deputy Treviño said, “The reforms got to
Congress already fully cooked” (Interview 3).
The analysis of the legislative process leads us to conclude that
the legislature lacks influence over tax decisions. Congress’s changes
to the revenue law have been very small, around 1.1 percent a year
from 2000 to 2016. This minor role was reproduced in the 2013
reform, where legislative modifications to the bill were mostly inconsequential. The executive prevails over legislators due to Mexico’s
famously strong party discipline—with the president acting as head
of the party and because Congress lacks the technical capacity. Such
capacity would be particularly necessary in fiscal policy, yet legislators
depend greatly on the advice, data, and technical skills of Ministry of
Finance staff and the business sector. Upgrading the legislature’s
technical expertise is of utmost importance since only then “real and
open debates” can help us assess economic policy, “diffuse information among the electorate and enhance accountability, representation and transparency in the process” (Williams 2006, 139).
A final element tilting the balance to the executive is this branch’s
extensive constitutional capacities when it comes to tax policy. This
branch of government can introduce decrees that end up shaping the
tax outcome and are not subject to legislative oversight, as President
Peña Nieto did a month after the 2013 revenue law was published.
The decrees silently changed what had been passed in the legislature
and softened the tax reform impact in response to requests from
private sector lobbyists. Moreover, granting tax exemptions, fiscal
subsidies, and benefits results in costly tax expenditures, which in
2019 were equivalent to 3.9 percent of GDP. The pay-off of these
decrees is questionable in light of Mexico’s historical low tax collection, the tax expenditures’ unknown effectiveness, and the regressive
tendency of these special treatments, tax benefits, and fiscal
subsidies.
The analysis of the 2013 tax reform shows a legislature with
a quite limited voice in tax policy, as opposed to a very powerful
executive, which contradicts the healthy balance of power that
should exist among branches of government. Moreover, it
encourages business groups to direct their heavy lobbying to the
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executive. This scenario, in turn, allows business interests to negotiate with the executive away from the public eye, either at the
agenda-setting stage or even after congressional approval of the tax
bill, given that the president can dictate tax policy by decree.
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Casar, Maria A. 1999. “Las relaciones entre el poder ejecutivo y el legislativo:
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Diario de los Debates. 2014. Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Poder Legislativo Federal, LXII Legislatura.
Year 2. Mexico City, January 8, 2014, session no. 3. http://cronica.
diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/62/2do/1P/CPerma/ene/01L62A2CP03.
html.
Diaz Cayeros, Alberto, and Beatriz Magaloni. 1998. “Autoridad presupuestal
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2009. “Estudio de la OCDE sobre el proceso presupuestario en México.”
OCDE Journal on Budgeting, no.1, 1–158.

Unda Gutiérrez, The Superfluous Congress

121

Ondetti, Gabriel. 2017. “The Power of Preferences: Economic Elites and Light
Taxation in Mexico.” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Polı́tcas y Sociales
231:47–76.
Ortiz Mena, Antonio. 1998. El desarrollo estabilizador: Reflexiones sobre
una época. Mexico City: Colegio de México, Fondo de Cultura
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